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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HOW FAST IS TOO FAST? THE
COURT'S RACE TO FIND REASONABLENESS IN HIGHSPEED CHASES*
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).

Katie Coxe**

Petitioner, a county deputy, clocked respondent driving 73 miles per
hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone and signaled respondent to pull over.'
Respondent ignored the signal, sped away, and led petitioner on an erratic
high-speed chase down a two-lane road.' Nearly ten miles into the chase,
petitioner bumped respondent's vehicle; respondent lost control and
crashed.3 As a result ofthe crash, respondent was rendered a quadriplegic.4
Respondent filed suit against petitioner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure.5 Petitioner asserted a qualified immunity defense and filed a

* Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the HuberC. HurstAward for Outstanding
Case Comment in Spring 2008.
** J.D. expected May 2009, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I dedicate this
Comment to my parents, Mary and Hank Coxe, with gratitude for their love, encouragement and
good genes. I am also thankful to Patty Barksdale for her patient guidance and her friendship.
1. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (2007). This Comment reflects the Supreme
Court's version of the facts as gleaned from the videotape; notably, and in contrast to the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court declined to adopt respondent's version of the facts due to conflicts
between the videotape and respondent's account of the events. Id. at 1775-76. The Supreme Court
found that the videotape blatantly contradicted respondent's account of the events and that no
reasonable jury could believe respondent. Id. at 1776.
2. Id. at 1772. During the chase, respondent narrowly evaded capture in a parking lot of a
shopping center after colliding with petitioner's vehicle. Id. at 1773.
3. Id.Petitioner initially decided to attempt a Precision Intervention Technique (PIT), which
causes a fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop. Id. However, petitioner decided to bump respondent's
vehicle, instead of implementing PIT, because the vehicles were going too fast to safely execute
PIT. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1773. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in relevant part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Respondent specifically contends that petitioner used
excessive force in the crash, and use of such force resulted in an unreasonable seizure. Scott, 127
S. Ct. at 1773.
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motion for summary judgment. Finding that material issues of fact
surrounding the qualified immunity issue warranted submission to a jury,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the
motion.7 On interlocutory appeal," the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed. 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.'
The Court HELD that an officer's attempt to end a dangerous car chase,
that threatens the lives of innocent people, does not violate the Fourth
Amendment even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious
injury or death."
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 The U.S. Supreme Court
has extended this protection to cover bodily intrusions by the
government.' 3 The Court in Tennessee v. Garner4 considered whether an
unreasonable seizure occurred when a police officer shot and killed an
unarmed fifteen-year-old boy who was attempting to flee from the scene
of a burglary. 5 Finding the seizure unreasonable, the Court held that an

6. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773. Qualified immunity completely protects the immune party from
a suit. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 517 (1985). "Under the standard of qualified
immunity... [the party claiming immunity] will be entitled to immunity so long as his actions do
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Id. at 524 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). In the instant case, the Court did not resolve the issue of qualified immunity because it
concluded that petitioner's actions were reasonable. See Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774, 1779.
7. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
8. Id.Interlocutory appeal is available for an order denying qualified immunity because such
an order is "effectively unreviewable" after trial. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27.
9. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773-74. The court of appeals, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to respondent, found that petitioner's actions could amount to deadly force under
Tennessee v. Garner,471 U.S. 1 (1985), and that a jury could find that use of deadly force during
the chase violated respondent's right to be free from excessive force during a seizure. Scott, 127 S.
Ct. at 1773-74. The court concluded that the law gave "fair notice" to "reasonable law enforcement
officers" that such actions were not unlawful. Id. at 1774 (quoting Harris v. Coweta County, 433
F.3d 803, 817 (11 th Cir. 2005)).
10. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774.
11. Id. at 1779.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. For example, "[w]henever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he
has seized that person." Garner,471 U.S. at 7 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 878 (1975)).
14. Id. at 1.
15. Id. at 3-4. The officer acted pursuant to a Tennessee statute which permitted an officer
to use "all the necessary means to effect the arrest" when a suspect flees or forcibly resists after
given notice of the officer's intent to arrest. Id. at 4-5 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108
(1982)).
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officer cannot use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect unless using
deadly force is necessary to prevent the suspect's escape, and there is
probable cause to believe the suspect represents a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. 6
The Court applied a balancing test to assess the reasonableness of the
seizure.' 7 It weighed the nature and quality of the intrusion on a suspect's
Fourth Amendment interests against the significance of the governmental
interests warranting the seizure.' 8 In Garner,the suspect had a paramount
interest in his preserving his life; the Court determined his interest was not
outweighed by the government's interest in effective law enforcement. 9
Because the suspect posed no threat to the officer, the Court reasoned his
flight did not warrant the use of deadly force.2"
The Court in Grahamv. Connor2 clarified Garnerby holding that all
excessive force claims arising from Fourth Amendment seizures must be
analyzed under an 'objective reasonableness' standard.22 Graham filed a §
1983 action against officers who detained, handcuffed, and threw him into
the back of a police car for hurriedly entering and exiting a convenience
store.23 The Court vacated the court of appeals's directed verdict for the
officers and remanded for reconsideration of the reasonableness issue.24
The Court relied on Garner's balancing test and explained that in
determining whether the totality of the circumstances renders a seizure
unreasonable, notable considerations include: the severity of the crime,
whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to public safety, and

16. Id. at 11. The Court acknowledged the converse of its holding, namely that:
if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to
believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to
prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.
Id. at 11-12.
17. Id. at 7-8.
18. Garner,471 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
19. Id. at 9. The Court highlighted the intrusiveness of using deadly force as "unmatched"
and rejected the contention that "[e]ffectiveness in making arrests requires the resort to deadly
force, or at least the meaningful threat thereof." Id. at 9-10.
20. See id. at ll.
21. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
22. Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978)).
23. Id. at 388-89.
24. Id. at 399. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's application of a broad
substantive due process analysis, which the Supreme Court found incorrect because Graham
brought a specific claim and there was a constitutional standard governing his claim. Id.at 393-94.
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whether the suspect was attempting to flee from arrest.25 Moreover,
reasonableness should be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable
officer at the scene.26 Though agreeing with the majority's Fourth
Amendment analysis, concurring Justice Blackmun opined that substantive
due process claims should remain available in cases where the use of force
was "demonstrably unreasonable.""
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis,28 the Court considered whether a
police officer violated substantive due process when he caused the death
of a suspect during a high-speed automobile chase through a residential
neighborhood.29 The officer pursued the suspect at speeds of over 100
miles per hour;3" the chase ended after the officer's car skidded into the
suspect's tipped over motorcycle and propelled the suspect seventy feet.3 '
The suspect was pronounced dead at the scene. 32 The Court rejected the
Fourteenth Amendment challenge.33 It held that the use of excessive force
would violate substantive due process only where an officer acts to cause
harm unrelated to arresting a suspect, and thus, the officer's conduct would
"shock the conscience. 34
Moreover, the Lewis Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
specifically pertained to unreasonable seizure claims and that it should
govern.35 However, the Fourth Amendment afforded no protection to the
suspect because the government's intrusion was unintentional.36
Nevertheless, by rejecting the suspect's Fourteenth Amendment claim, the
25. Id. at 396.
26. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The Court explained the logic behind this requirement: "[t]he
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced
to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97.
27. Id. at 400.
28. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
29. Id. at 836.
30. Id. at 837.
31. Id. The chase began after the motorcyclist refused to heed the officer's warnings to stop.
Id. at 836-37. The chase lasted 1.3 miles before the motorcycle tipped over as the driver attempted
to turn. Id. at 837. The driver got out of the way, but he was unable to escape before the patrol car
skidded into him. Id.
32. Id.
33. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843.
34. Id. at 836.
35. See id. at 842. "Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the
more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims."
Id. (alteration in original omitted) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality
opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.)).
36. Id. at 844.
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Court effectively closed one avenue for potential claims against police
officers who use excessive force.37 It concluded that such claims were more
appropriately suited for the Fourth Amendment.38
In the instant case, the Court rejected respondent's argument that the
Garneranalysis controlled.39 Instead, relying on a videotape of the incident
as its factual basis,4 ° the Court applied an objective reasonableness
standard in its analysis.4' Weighing the nature and quality of the intrusion
of respondent's Fourth Amendment interests against the government's
justification for the intrusion,42 the Court determined that petitioner's
43
actions created a high likelihood of serious injury or death to respondent;
however, the Court found that the high likelihood of serious injury or death
to respondent was equal in weight to the legitimate threat to the lives of the
officers, pedestrians, and other motorists who were present during
respondent's flight." The Court broke the 'tie' with relative culpability:
respondent was wholly responsible for the harm petitioner acted to
eliminate and petitioner's actions were reasonable.45
37. See id.
38. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844.
39. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (2007). The Court characterized Garner as
factually distinguishable from the instant case. See id. Because "Garnerhad nothing to do with one
car striking another or even with car chases in general .... A police car's bumping a fleeing car is,
in fact, not much like a policeman's shooting a gun so as to hit a person, the Scott Court held
Garner'spreconditions inapplicable." Id. (quoting Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriffs Dep't, 962
F.2d 1563, 1577 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (Edmondson, J., dissenting)). Respondent argued that Garner
mandated three preconditions before the use of deadly force would have been reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment: "(1) The suspect must have posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm
to the officer or others; (2) deadly force must have been necessary to prevent escape; and (3) where
feasible, the officer must have given the suspect some warning." Id.
40. Id. at 1774-75. The Court noted that "[f]ar from being the cautious and controlled driver
the lower court depicts, what we see on the video more closely resembles a Hollywood-style car
chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk
of serious injury." Id. at 1775-76.
41. Id. at 1778.
42. Id.
43. The Court described the balancing "equation" as "weighing the perhaps lesser probability
of injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger probability of injuring or
killing a single person." Id.
44. The Court distinguished the instant case from Garnerby noting that the risk to respondent
was "not the near certaintyof death posed by, say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head."
Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778.
45. See id. In his dissent, Justice Stevens contended that the majority's strict rule was
antithetical to "the flexible and case-by-case 'reasonableness' approach applied in Garner and
Graham v. Connor," and that the rule was "arguably inapplicable to the case at hand, given that it
is not clear that this chase threatened the life of any 'innocent bystande[r]."' Id. at 1785 (alteration
in original) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Significantly, the instant Court rejected respondent's suggestion that the
incident could have been avoided had the police ceased pursuit.' The
Court reasoned that petitioner's actions were sure to end the risk to the
public and backing off did not guarantee the same result.47 Pragmatically,
the Court noted an officer would have difficulty notifying a suspect that the
officer backed off and ended the pursuit.48 Moreover, the Court adamantly
refused to create a rule that would offer suspects freedom from pursuit if
they reached a threshold level of recklessness and endangered enough
innocent lives. 49 The instant Court formulated a "sensible" rule: an
officer's efforts to end a high-speed car chase endangering innocent lives
do not amount to an unreasonable seizure even where the attempt poses a
risk of serious injury or death to the fleeing suspect.50
The instant Court's rigid rule is adverse to the traditional flexibility of
reasonableness in Fourth Amendment analyses." While purporting to
trudge "through the factbound morass of 'reasonableness, ' '52 the instant
Court applied a simple balancing test that accounted for general, rather
than specific, details of the case.53 The Court's limited factual inquiry
produced a paradoxically strict rule for high speed car chases. 4
Notably, the instant Court rejected Garner'sprerequisites to the use of
deadly force, contending that the cases were so factually dissimilar that the
Garneranalysis did not apply.55 The Court recognized that Garner'sfacts

46. Id.at 1778 (majority opinion).
47. Id.at 1778-79.
48. Id.at 1779. The Court worried that "[h]ad respondent looked in his rear-view mirror and
seen the police cars deactivate their flashing lights and turn around, he would have had no idea
whether they were truly letting him get away, or simply devising a new strategy for capture." Id.
49. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1779. The Court strongly worded the rejection, explaining that it was
"loath to lay down" such a rule, and that "[tihe Constitution assuredly does not impose this
invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness." Id.
50. Id.
51. Notably, in concurring, Justice Ginsberg explained that she did not see the "decision as
articulating a mechanical per se rule," but rather, she saw the majority's conclusion as "situation
specific." Id.(Ginsberg, J., concurring). Justice Breyer, also concurring, viewed the rule as "too
absolute." Id.at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, however, dissented, he contended
that the rule completely contradicted the reasonableness analyses set forth in Garner and Graham.
Id.at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id.at 1778 (majority opinion).
53. See id
54. See Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1779.
55. Id.at 1777. "[I]n this case, unlike in Garner, it was respondent's flight itself(by means
of a speeding automobile) that posed the threat of'serious physical harm.., to others."' Id.at 1777
n.9.
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were "vastly different" from the facts at hand and acknowledged its prior
reliance on a deeply fact-based analysis. 6 Interestingly, however, the
instant Court cursorily weighed the danger to respondent against the danger
to the public.57 It concluded both dangers were likely to have materialized
and that, with the two being equal in weight, the respondent's culpability
tipped the scale.58 Thus, the instant Court's surface-level adventure into the
factual "morass" ultimately constructed a basic framework for future courts
to find similar seizures reasonable. 9
While the instant Court accounted for two of Graham's factors, it failed
to consider that respondent was fleeing from a relatively insignificant
crime-speeding.6" Although that fact would probably not have tipped the
scales of reasonableness in respondent's favor, its explicit consideration
would have underscored the instant Court's decision to adopt a factspecific analysis and would provide clearer guidance for future similar
cases.6 Moreover, considering this fact would establish another "tiebreaker" in close cases, analogous (and in addition) to the instant Court's
use of relative culpability,62 without departing significantly from the basic
balancing test.63
In his dissent, Justice Stevens engaged in the highly fact-specific
analysis' 4 that the majority failed to undertake. Justice Stevens reviewed
the same videotape as the majority;65 he noted the number of cars
respondent passed, the number of intersections respondent drove through
when the lights were red, and the number of times respondent pulled into
the opposite lane with and without signaling first.6 6 Justice Stevens's
delicate analysis contrasts with the majority's broad balancing approach.67
Justice Stevens primarily concluded that significant factual issues
warranted ajury's attention, and he disapproved of the majority's strict rule
as antithetical to traditional Fourth Amendment analyses; 68 his disapproval
warrants consideration.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Seeid. at 1777.
Id.
Id. at 1778.
Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778.
Id. at 1777 n.9.
Id. at 1778.
Id.
Id.
Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1781-83, 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1782-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1782-84; id. at 1777-79 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In a Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" context, is the majority's
simple balancing test preferable to Justice Stevens's fact-sensitive
analysis? Justice Stevens's approach might benefit those who flee in a
"less dangerous" manner by running two, rather than six or seven, red
lights (as respondent did here).69 Such an intricate analysis, however,
would place a heavy burden on courts to know which factors to consider
and what weight to give each factor. The majority's balancing test, on the
other hand, comports with traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness
analyses in taking into account the harm to the public and the harm to the
suspect,7" but fails to account for facts that might militate in the suspect's
favor. 7 Nevertheless, the majority's balancing test provides a clearer
framework for courts and will likely yield less disparate results.
Still, a middle ground exists to guide courts: the majority's balancing
test molded to the individual facts of each case72 through consideration of
specific factors. First, Justice Stevens's dissent advocates attention to
whether less dangerous alternatives to ending the high-speed car chase
existed." While not necessarily decisive, evaluation of whether less drastic
measures could have achieved a safer result74 affords some judicial
flexibility in the reasonableness analysis without straying far from
traditional notions of reasonableness. The majority's use of relative
culpability75 and the Graham Court's consideration of the type of crime7 6
provide additional markers for a fact-sensitive reasonableness analysis.
Finally, the entire seizure analysis should occur from the perspective of a

69. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens discussed facts that
were integral to both sides' arguments: (1) respondent ran two red lights but was drove in a "nonaggressive fashion;" (2) petitioner's path "was largely clear;" and (3) petitioner did not warn
respondent before ramming him. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Harris v. Coweta County, 433
F.3d 807, 819 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005)).
70. Id. at 1778 (majority opinion).
71. Id. at 1778.
72. Id.
73. Id.at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that "less drastic measures-in
this case, the use of stop sticks or a simple warning issued from a loudspeaker-could have avoided
such a tragic result." Id.
74. The same result in so far as the chase ended with the suspect's capture, but without a
tragic end.
75. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778.
76. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The GrahamCourt concluded that Fourth
Amendment reasonableness "is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application" but
"requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Id at 396
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
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reasonable officer on the scene, particularly where the seizure results in
death and hindsight invites immediate conclusions of unreasonableness."
Furthermore, courts should follow Graham and Lewis and use a
thorough and balanced analysis to decide unreasonable seizure claims.
Grahamheld that all unreasonable seizure claims against law enforcement
officers must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard,78 and Lewis rejected a substantive due process excessive police
force claim because the force was not directed at causing the harm and did
not meet the "shock the conscience" standard.79 In effect, Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" remains the only check on a police officer's
use of excessive force in a high speed chase.8"
While protecting the innocent public from a dangerous fleeing suspect
is of paramount importance,8 judicial review must also adequately
safeguard the suspect from excessive police force. Thus, careful review of
an unreasonable seizure claim in a high-speed pursuit should include at a
82
minimum and from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
a consideration of the competing interests of the public and the
individual,83 less dangerous alternatives to ending the pursuit,84 the relative
culpability of the fleeing suspect, and the severity of the crime at issue. 5
Finally, reviewing courts should take into account other factors
traditionally relevant to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry that
promote public safety or individual privacy interests.

77. Id. at 396-97.
78. Id. at 395. The Graham Court held "that all claims that law enforcement officers have
used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness'
standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach." Id. The Court reasoned that "the
Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection... [unlike] the
more generalized notion of 'substantive due process."' Id.
79. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998).
80. Id.
81. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007).
82. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
83. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778.
84. Id. at 1785.
85. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

544
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